



## ISLAM KHAN'S MILITARY STRATEGY: THE KEY TO MUGHAL SUPREMACY IN THE KOCH TERRITORIES

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### Abstract

This article examines the strategic brilliance of Islam Khan, the Mughal Subedar of Bengal, in consolidating Mughal dominance over the Koch territories during the early 17th century. Amidst a landscape defined by intense rivalry between regional powers such as Lakshminarayan and Parikshit, and the looming presence of the Ahoms, Islam Khan implemented a series of calculated military campaigns, diplomatic alliances, and psychological tactics to assert Mughal supremacy. His strategic foresight not only quelled local resistance but also brought the Koch territories firmly under Mughal control, serving as a pivotal moment in the expansion of the Mughal Empire's eastern frontier. By integrating these territories into the Mughal administrative system, Islam Khan laid the groundwork for sustained imperial authority in the region. This article also explores how his methods influenced broader Mughal imperial policies, particularly in the context of frontier management and the assimilation of culturally distinct regions into the empire. Through a detailed analysis of historical events and sources, the study sheds light on the enduring legacy of Islam Khan's strategic mastery in Mughal imperial history.

**Keywords:** *Islam Khan, Mughal Policy, conflict, Military strategy, Koch Behar, Koch Hajo*

### I

The early 17th century was an important period for the Mughal Empire, when they were trying to extend their influence to the far reaches of the Indian subcontinent. During Emperor Jahangir's rule, the empire's focus shifted to the eastern frontier, where the strategically important Koch regions brought them opportunities on the one hand, and challenges on the other. Lower Assam and West Bengal and Bengal, was not only an important gateway to the Northeast,<sup>i</sup> but also a region rich in resources and politically important. In the late 16th century, during the reign of Akbar, the Mughal Empire established a defensive alliance with Koch king Narayan Narayan.<sup>ii</sup> This alliance, which began in 1578, was influenced by the Kochs' desire to secure their eastern frontier against a powerful regional rival, the Ahom kingdom. These alliances were a way of gradually expanding their influence while avoiding direct conflict, allowing them to consolidate power elsewhere in the subcontinent. In the late sixteenth century, the Mughals attempted to bring these defensive alliances under direct control, resulting in a subordinate alliance with the Koch kingdom.<sup>iii</sup> This change was driven by the Mughals' desire to assert their authority in the region more firmly, ensuring a steady flow of resources and securing a strategic base for further expansion into the Northeast.

**Published by:**

**Pather Dabi Educational Trust, (Regn No: IV-1402-00064/2023), Under Govt. of West Bengal, India.**

At the helm of the Mughal expansionist effort into the Koch territories was Islam Khan I, the newly appointed subahdar of Bengal in 1608.<sup>iv</sup> Tasked with bringing the rebellious Koch rulers under Mughal control, Islam Khan embarked on a series of military campaigns that would cement his legacy as a master strategist. His approach was not merely about brute force; it involved a calculated blend of military prowess, diplomatic maneuvering, and strategic intelligence. The Koch region, with its complex network of alliances and resistance movements, posed a formidable challenge to Mughal ambitions. However, through a combination of tactical brilliance and careful planning, Islam Khan managed to overcome these obstacles, establishing Mughal supremacy in the region. This article explores how Islam Khan's military strategy played a pivotal role in securing the Koch territories for the Mughal Empire, ensuring their dominance in the north-eastern frontier.

## II

King Nara Narayan divided his kingdom into two parts: West Koch Behar and East Koch Behar. Many historians believe this division was made for administrative convenience. He appointed his brother Chilarai as the ruler of East Koch Behar. After Chilarai's death, Koch Behar was succeeded by his son Raghudev. Although Ruhu Dev never waged war against Nara Narayan, he declared independence after Nara Narayan's death and clashed with his successor, Lakshminarayan, in the Koch kingdom.<sup>v</sup> Following Ruhu Dev's death, his son Parikshit Narayan succeeded him as the ruler of East Koch Behar, and the conflict between the rulers of the two regions continued. The ongoing conflict between the Lakshminarayans of Koch Behar and the Parikshits of Koch Hajo in the early sixteenth century profoundly affected the political situation in the Koch region. Both rulers tried to strengthen their position by forging alliances with the Ahom kingdom. Parikshit successfully forged an alliance with the Ahom king Pratap Singha and cemented this relationship through marriage, with the main objective of protecting Kamrup from outside threats.<sup>vi</sup> However, despite this alliance, both the Mughals and the Ahoms were more focused on establishing their hegemony in the frontier regions and less inclined to give full support to their allies.

As Parikshit continued to encroach on his territory, Lakshminarayan, having failed to secure substantial support from the Ahoms, ultimately sought assistance from the Mughals. This led to his acceptance of Mughal vassalage in 1609, marking a significant turning point in the history of Mughal policy on the Northeast Frontier.<sup>vii</sup> Diplomatic engagements between Lakshminarayan and the Mughals, particularly with Islam Khan, played a crucial role in shaping the Mughal campaign against Parikshit. Parikshit's refusal to submit to Mughal authority, coupled with his insult to the Mughal ally King Raghunath of Sushang and the imprisonment of Raghunath's family, provoked a Mughal invasion of Kamrup. The primary objective of this invasion was to establish full control over the resource-rich Kamrup region. The family rivalries, territorial ambitions, and deep-seated jealousies within the Koch royal family were intricately linked to Mughal strategic interests.<sup>viii</sup>

## III

The Mughal military campaigns under Islam Khan, especially the campaign against Parikshit Narayan, have gone down in history as a remarkable example of the military strategy and administrative prowess of the Mughal Empire. The campaign started from a small village called Barampur, about six miles from Dacca, where the Mughal army first began its advance. Their destination was a place called Tuke, about 28 miles northeast of Dhaka. Arriving there, Islam Khan's forces set up a preliminary camp, which was a highly organized and strategically important move.<sup>ix</sup> Through this gathering, Islam Khan provided a powerful example of the military prowess and strategic foresight of the Mughal Empire.

Islam Khan's campaign was the product of much preparation, which he had achieved through various successful campaigns against local rulers and regions. These earlier campaigns proved Islam Khan to be a very capable and talented military leader. As a result, the basis for the upcoming campaign against

Parikshit Narayan was solidified. The Tuke rally was not just a troop rally; It was a massive mobilization of resources, personnel, and strategic planning. The forces under Islam Khan were diverse and well organized, including both land and naval elements. The land forces were led by able officers like Mukarram Khan and Sheikh Kamal, who played a very important role in the overall strategy of the Mughal forces. 6,000 horses, 10,000–12,000 foot men, 500 vessels, and 300 elephants made up the army. Furthermore, seven hundred thousand rupees were set aside for the army's outlays.<sup>x</sup> Due to the geographical features of the region, the naval force, commanded by King Raghunath and King Satrajit, was essential to the success of the campaign. Also, the local leader Musa Khan and his brothers, under Abdal Khan, supplied a fleet of boats to the navy. This mix of land and naval power indicates the extensive nature of the campaign and reflects the ability of the Mughals to adapt to different combat environments.

Tuke Jamaat was a calculated operation that served as a central location for Mughal military units. This force under Islam Khan consisted of Khans of various ranks, Mansabdars, officers, well-known warriors, cavalry, artillery and infantry of various localities. The presence of such notables as Mirza Imam Quli Beg Shamlu and Mirza Nathan demonstrated the high degree of leadership and experience of the assembled forces. After gathering at Tuk, the expeditionary force proceeded towards the East Koch region. The journey was carefully considered, considering the auspicious moments and potential challenges along the route. This careful planning reflected the larger strategic mindset of Islam Khan and his officers, ensuring that the campaign was conducted with precision and foresight. However, during this campaign, internal conflicts among the Mughal officers caused some problems. The war between Mukarram Khan and Mirza Nathan is an example of this internal conflict. Behind the conflict was the instigation of Sheikh Kamal, who worked to fuel political aspirations and internal strife. Especially during the month of Ramadan, there was a conflict over their march schedule. Mirza Nathan decided to march early in the day before breaking his fast, but Mukarram Khan wanted to wait until evening to break his fast. Disputes over this schedule led to tension between the two sides. Such internal conflicts often hampered military operations and became a major challenge for Islam Khan. Sheikh Kamal sent a letter to Mirza Nathan to escalate the tension, which made the situation even more heated.<sup>xi</sup>

Islam Khan, who was the Subadar of Bengal, played a major role in resolving these internal conflicts. He ordered the easing of tensions between Mukarram Khan and Mirza Nathan and warned Mukarram Khan to be aware of Sheikh Kamal's influence. Mukarram Khan followed Islam Khan's advice and respected his authority. With Islam Khan's involvement, tensions between Mukarram Khan and Mirza Nathan began to subside, and the expeditionary forces were able to refocus on their objectives. After the dispute was settled, the expedition marched towards their target Kamrup region.<sup>xii</sup>

### III

The first battle of the Mughal forces took place against the troops of Rular Parikshit Narayan at Salkonah, situated on the southwestern border of Kamrup. In this battle, a bloody encounter took place between the Mughal fleet led by the Mughal commander Islam Khan and the fleet of King Parikshit. The king carefully stationed three hundred well-equipped warships at Salkonah, commanded by one of his relatives. The aim of this fleet was to prevent the advance of the Mughal forces and to control important waterways. During war, both sides exert their full force. The use of cannon fire and other weapons creates chaos on the battlefield. Although King Parikshit's forces put up strong resistance, the superior planning and naval capabilities of the Mughal forces led to their victory. Ultimately, the Mughals defeated the Koch Hajo fleet and captured most of their warships.<sup>xiii</sup> Mukarram Khan's brother Shaikh Muhiuddin played an important role in this victory, and Islam Khan especially praised him for his strategic skill and leadership.<sup>xiv</sup>

After the victory at Salkana, Islam Khan strategically sent additional reinforcements to maintain the momentum of the campaign and prepared his forces for the subsequent Dhubri campaign. The next morning, the Mughal army marched along the river and with the help of boatmen began to smooth the way for the advance. In this campaign Islam Khan sent an additional 1,000 cavalry and 1,000 matchlocks under the command of his brother Sheikh Habibullah. With reinforcements, the Mughal forces made further inroads into the Kutch region, maintaining an organized advance. As part of Islam Khan's plan, the Mughal forces advanced in an organized manner, divided into different regiments. Mukarram Khan was given central command, the vanguard was led by Mirza Imam Quli, Mirak Najafi, and other officers. The right and left wings of the force are kept under separate command, so that each unit is competent in a specific role.<sup>xv</sup>

In the first attempt to capture the Dhubri fort, the Mughal army faced serious problems due to lack of discipline and coordination. The Mughal army led by Mukarram Khan advanced slowly and established a camp about two kos from the fort. According to the plan, this camp was to be fortified before a second stronghold was built near the fort. However, Mirza Imam Quli and some Afghan officers ignored the pre-arranged plan and attacked the fort from the river bank without permission. This reckless move led to a bloody battle, which lacked the desired element of surprise and proper coordination for the Mughal forces. Sheikh Kamal declared it foolish to continue this imprudent battle and ordered Mirza Imam Quli and his troops to retreat. Despite these setbacks, the Mughal forces strengthened their camps, showing resilience and determination. The next morning, they proceeded to build a second fort near Dhubri Fort. But history repeated itself when Mirza Imam Quli and other officials again attacked from the river bank without permission.

These incidents clearly highlight the internal challenges and discipline problems of the Mughal army. A second attempt by some generals to capture the fort of Akal Odhubri failed due to poor decision-making, inadequate planning and internal rivalries among the imperial forces. Although Sheikh Kamal initially objected to the lack of planning, Raja Raghunath persuaded him to launch a swift and surprise attack. Unprepared, the Khans marched towards the fort with elephants, but the enemy inside the fort forced them to rout with heavy fire. Despite the failure, Mirza Nathan displayed extraordinary courage and led his troops closer to the fort. However, Sheikh Kamal ordered Mirza Saifuddin to withdraw Mirza Nathan and his troops from the battlefield, as he feared that Mirza Nathan would claim all the credit for conquering the fort. When Mirza Nathan and Sheikh Ashraf returned, they harshly criticized Sheikh Kamal for losing their honor. Humiliated Sheikh Kamal returned to the royal fort. Islam Khan was greatly alarmed to hear of this failed attempt and advised Sheikh Kamal to reconcile with Sheikh Ashraf and Mirza Nathan.<sup>xvi</sup>

Overall, hasty decision-making, poor planning and internal conflicts among the imperial forces made the second attempt to capture the Dhubri fort a failure. As a result, Sheikh Kamal and his forces suffered heavy losses and weakened their position. Unsanctioned actions upset well-planned plans and exposed the inner weakness of the Mughal military leadership. However, the Imperial command persisted with the objective of capturing the Dhubri fort despite these odds, demonstrating their firm commitment to the campaign.

Facing stiff resistance from Parikshit's forces, the Mughals made extensive preparations for the next attempt. They cleared all the jungles around their forts, built batteries and ramparts against the fort walls and built winding roads covered by double walls to advance and attack rival forts. Duties and tasks were assigned to each regiment and they were instructed to be careful in their respective activities. The Governor of Bengal, Islam Khan, kept in close touch with the daily progress of the campaign. After spending more than three months in preparations for the attack, Dhubri Fort was surrounded by underground trenches and elevated positions for field artillery. Throughout the campaign the utmost precautions were taken to prevent night attacks by the Assamese, in which they undoubtedly excelled<sup>xvii</sup>

The main glacis and trenches near the enemy forts were placed under the direct control of Mukarram Khan and Sheikh Kamal. The two rear trenches are assigned to Mirza Imam and Mirza Nathan. Other prominent generals were placed on the right and left wings. The sappers and miners were ordered to advance towards the trenches of the enemy's fort under the protection of Glacis and to excavate the walls of the fort. As soon as they make a breach, all the regiments will rush forward with strong elephants before them, and thus the victory is won.<sup>xviii</sup>

The attackers made zigzag roads and defensive walls around Bori Fort to attack. They tried to weaken the walls of the fort by digging up the soil near the ramparts. Each regiment was assigned specific duties to prevent enemy resistance. Mukarram Khan and Sheikh Kamal were in control of the main glacis and nearby trenches. Under their leadership, the Mughal army breached the walls of the enemy's fort and launched a swift attack with elephants in the front.

Finally, the plan of the Mughal forces succeeded, and they entered through the main gate of the fort. After a fierce fight, the fort's defenses collapsed, and the Mughal forces were able to capture the Dhubri fort. Fatah Khan, who escaped with the Kutch army.

Shaikh Kamal, the Mughal commander, sent a peace proposal to King Parikrishna. The king was then at Gilah—his summer capital, a little north of Dhubri. Although the King of Kamrup was preparing for a frontal war with the Mughals, he still remained loyal to Shaikh Kamal. But Islam Khan ultimately rejected the proposal and ordered the king imprisoned or killed. (Ibid., 240-241). Sheikh Kamal then regrouped his army and prepared for a full-scale attack on Prakash. On the other hand, King Parikshit also mobilized his forces to resist the Mughal invasion and made all necessary preparations for resistance.

In this tense state of battle, Lakshminarayan, who was already preparing to invade Parikshit's kingdom of Khutaghat, launched his attack. This attack by Lakshminarayan became yet another new challenge for Parikshit. At this time a fierce battle broke out between father and nephew, which marked a rare event in the history of Kamarupa. This battle complicated Sheikh Kamal's plans, and intensified the conflict between the Mughal forces and Kamrup's army. Sheikh Kamal again got involved in the war and continued his military campaign against Parikshit. The Mughal forces tried to conquer different parts of Parikshit's kingdom by showing their military might and strategic skill. Thus, a new phase of war begins, which plays an important role in determining the future of Kamarupa.

#### IV

The Bhati zamindars' siege of Gila prompted Raja Parikshit to start a fresh campaign following the fight at Dhubri Fort. With the help of fifty elephants and a boat, his son-in-law Dumaria successfully led an attack on the guard fort at the mouth of the Ghajadhar River, defeating several enemy soldiers.<sup>xix</sup> Parikshit was planning a significant assault against Dhubri Fort in the meantime, but his strategy encountered obstacles. The wooden bridge crumbled while crossing a river, and the soldiers' progress was severely impeded by an enraged elephant.

Despite Dumaria's initial success at the guard fort, Parikshit's forces faced setbacks. By the time they reached Dhubri Fort, the imperial officers, including Mukarram Khan and Sheikh Kamal, had fortified their positions, postponing plans to recapture the fort. They sent Jamal Khan and Lachmi Rajput to resist Parikshit's forces. Though Parikshit's first attack on the fort succeeded, the combined resistance of the Afghan and Rajput forces proved formidable. As night fell, Parikshit decided to retreat, abandoning his equipment. Following his retreat, the imperial forces celebrated their victory and collected a large amount of booty, marking the failure of Parikshit's attempt to capture Dhubri Fort.<sup>xx</sup>

## V

After his defeat, Parikshit was pursued by the Mughal army for six days and nights. The soldiers, subsisting on coarse rice and beef, grew increasingly weak. By the fourth camp, they were in a dire situation. When they reached the banks of the Dilai River, rumors of a night attack spread, causing tension among the troops. However, Mirza Nathan's advice to avoid an unnecessary battle was heeded, and the army avoided chaos. Despite the Mughals' difficulties in crossing the Banas River, they continued their pursuit. Eventually, Parikshit reached Kamarupa and assessed his precarious situation. Realizing he had little chance of success, he decided to surrender. Parikshit sent an envoy, Ramdas, to Mukarram Khan and Sheikh Kamal to assure them of his submission. A date was set for his surrender on the banks of the Banas River. On the appointed day, Parikshit surrendered, and Mukarram Khan and Sheikh Kamal assured his safety by placing their hands on the Koran. The victorious imperial army then encamped on the banks of the Banas River, securing all the Thanas of Pandi. Mirza Qasim confirmed the emperor's victory and proceeded towards Jahangirnagar.<sup>xxi</sup>

## IV

Despite his surrender, Parikshit, along with the navy under the command of Dimarua Raja, launched an attack on the imperial forces along the banks of the Sonkosh River. Although Parikshit initially saw some success, the death of Dimarua Raja turned the tide against him. With their leader fallen, his forces retreated.<sup>xxii</sup> Parikshit then retreated to Ghila, pursued closely by the imperial forces. After crossing the Monas River and moving towards Barnagar, the Mughal fleet and land forces advanced to Pandu, leaving Parikshit with no option but to surrender once more. He relinquished all his possessions, and his kingdom, extending as far as the Barnadi River, was annexed to the Mughal Empire.<sup>xxiii</sup>

This marked the end of Parikshit's hostilities. After surrendering, Parikshit was taken to Dacca and later to Delhi. There, Emperor Jahangir made him promise to live peacefully with Lakshminarayan and imposed a fine of seven lakh rupees. Though initially ordered to return to his kingdom, the Governor of Bengal, suspecting Parikshit might pose a future threat, countermanded the emperor's order. Parikshit was prevented from returning home and died on the banks of the Ganges while journeying back to Delhi.

Upon Parikshit's surrender, the Mughal commander handed over the governance of Kamrup to Raja Lakshminarayan. Acting on the assurances of Mokarram Khan and Sheikh Kamal, Parikshit traveled to Dhaka, accompanied by Mirza Hasan Bengi and Raja Raghunath. At that time, the Subedar, Islam Khan, was hunting in the nearby forests of Bhawal and planned to meet Parikshit there. However, just before Parikshit arrived, Islam Khan fell ill and died unexpectedly. Parikshit, who proudly referred to himself as the ruler of a dynasty that had remained independent for a century, was hesitant to bow before the Mughal court. Islam Khan had intended to humiliate Parikshit by forcing him to bow in the imperial court, but his untimely death thwarted this plan. The Mughal officials, eager to fulfill their late Subedar's ambitions, arranged a court gathering and forced Parikshit to pay homage before Islam Khan's body. Despite their plans to imprison Parikshit, Mokarram Khan's strong opposition prevented this from happening, leading to the matter being referred to the Emperor's court for a final decision.<sup>xxiv</sup>

In May 1614, Islam Khan's brother, Qasim Khan, arrived in Dhaka as the new Subedar. He welcomed Parikshit and his son with honor, but this gesture had hidden motives. When Lakshminarayan arrived in Dhaka, he too was imprisoned. Despite orders to imprison Parikshit, Mokarram Khan's resistance made this difficult. Eventually, Qasim Khan resorted to conspiracy, separating Parikshit from Mokarram Khan and placing him under the supervision of Abdul Nabi. Mokarram Khan, deeply distressed and angered by these events, considered taking up arms against the Subedar. However, fearing the Emperor's wrath and feeling powerless, he abandoned the idea. Qasim Khan, not content with merely imprisoning Parikshit, sought to break his royal pride by teaching him the customs of the Mughal court. Eventually, both

Parikshit and his son were sent to the Emperor's court in Agra, marking the end of Kamrup's independence.<sup>xxv</sup>

## VII

In conclusion, Islam Khan's military strategy in the Koch territories was a decisive factor in the Mughal Empire's expansion into the northeastern frontier. His ability to blend military prowess with diplomatic acumen allowed the Mughals to overcome significant challenges and assert their authority in a strategically vital region. Despite internal conflicts and setbacks, the campaign exemplifies the Mughal Empire's resilience and determination to secure its borders and maintain its supremacy in the Indian subcontinent. Islam Khan's approach underscores the importance of a well-rounded strategy in military campaigns. His ability to adapt to the complex political landscape, manage diverse military forces, and address internal conflicts within the Mughal ranks played a pivotal role in the successful subjugation of the Koch territories. The integration of land and naval forces, along with the careful planning and resource management, demonstrated the Mughal Empire's capacity to execute large-scale operations in challenging environments. Ultimately, Islam Khan's military strategy in the Koch territories not only secured the northeastern frontier for the Mughal Empire but also contributed to the broader consolidation of Mughal power across the Indian subcontinent. His legacy as a master strategist is reflected in the enduring influence of Mughal authority in the region, shaping the course of history in the northeastern frontier for years to come.

### Notes:

<sup>i</sup>Wade, J.P. *An Account of Assam*. Edited by Benudhar Sharma, North Lakhimpur, 1927, p. 210.

<sup>ii</sup>Bhattacharyya, Sudhindra Nath. *A History of Mughal North-East Frontier Policy: Being a Study of the Political Relation of the Mughal Empire with Koch Bihar, Kamrup and Assam*. Calcutta, 1994, p.103

<sup>iii</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-12.

<sup>iv</sup> Raychaudhuri, Tapan. *Bengal Under Akbar and Jahangir*. Munshiram Manoharlal, 1953, p. 50.

<sup>v</sup> Nath, D. *History of the Koch Kingdom (c. 1515—1615)*. Mittal Publications, 1989, p. 85

<sup>vi</sup> Goswami, Govinda Ballav. *Ahom-Mughal Relations: A Study in Diplomatic History (1600-1663)*. 1982. Gauhati University, PhD dissertation, p.56.

<sup>vii</sup>Bhattacharyya, Sudhindra Nath. *A History of Mughal North-East Frontier Policy: Being a Study of the Political Relation of the Mughal Empire with Koch Bihar, Kamrup and Assam*. Calcutta, 1994, p.137

<sup>viii</sup>Ibid.

<sup>ix</sup>Ispahani, Mirza Nathan Alau-d din. *Baharistan-i-Ghaibi*. Translated by Dr. M. I. Borah, Gauhati, Assam, 1936, pp. 222-223.

<sup>x</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xi</sup>Ibid., pp. 32-33

<sup>xii</sup> Ibid

<sup>xiii</sup> Nath, D. *History of the Koch Kingdom (c. 1515—1615)*. Mittal Publications, 1989, p. 100.

<sup>xiv</sup> Ispahani, Mirza Nathan Alau-d din. *Baharistan-i-Ghaibi*. Translated by Dr. M. I. Borah, Gauhati, Assam, 1936, pp. 230-231.

<sup>xv</sup> Ibid., 32

<sup>xvi</sup> Ibid., 32

<sup>xvii</sup> Kalita, B. C. "The Battle of Dhubri (1612-1613 A.D.): Mughal-Assam Military Confrontation." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, vol. 45, 1984, p. 315. Indian History Congress.

<sup>xviii</sup> Ibid

<sup>xix</sup>Gait, Edward. *A History of Assam*. Thacker, Spink & Co., 1902, p. 67.

<sup>xx</sup> Goswami, Govinda Ballav. *Ahom-Mughal Relations: A Study in Diplomatic History (1600-1663)*. 1982. Gauhati University, PhD dissertation, pp. 64-65.

<sup>xxi</sup>Nath, D. *History of the Koch Kingdom (c. 1515—1615)*. Mittal Publications, 1989, pp. 102-103.

<sup>xxii</sup> Gait, Edward. *A History of Assam*. Thacker, Spink & Co., 1902, p. 68.,

<sup>xxiii</sup> Goswami, Govinda Ballav. *Ahom-Mughal Relations: A Study in Diplomatic History (1600-1663)*. 1982. Gauhati University, PhD dissertation, pp. 66..

<sup>xxiv</sup> Ahmed, Khan Choudhury Amanatullah. *Koch Bihar Itiha*. State Press, Cooch Behar, 1942, p. 256.

<sup>xxv</sup> Ibid. pp. 256-257.